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Stevens, J., Dissenting:

The Legacy of Heller
Second Amendment
scholars discuss the
late Justice John Paul
Stevens’s contributions
to one of the nation’s
thorniest debates
BY JOSEPH BLOCHER &
DARRELL A.H. MILLER

During his 34 years on the Supreme
Court, Justice John Paul Stevens participated in thousands of decisions
that addressed nearly every aspect
of American law. But he had no doubt
which one of those decisions was the
worst: District of Columbia v. Heller.1
He dissented from the opinion at
length, called it “unquestionably the
most clearly incorrect decision . . .
announced during my tenure on the
bench,”2 and continued to criticize it
up until his death in July of this year.
Others, closer to the Justice, have written and will write about his remarkable
tenure on the bench. But we want to

focus on his Second Amendment opinions and commentary, which we think
provide insight not only on the right
to keep and bear arms, but more generally on the late Justice’s approach to
law and judging.

“A well regulated Militia”:
The Law Before Heller
In Heller, the Supreme Court held for the
first time that the Second Amendment
guarantees a personal right to keep
and bear firearms for purposes unrelated to an organized militia. That 2008
holding was the culmination of decades
of effort by gun rights advocates to
transform the personal purposes interpretation of the Second Amendment
from a “fraud” — in the words of (then
retired) Chief Justice Warren Burger —
into the law of the land.3
The Second Amendment, which
reads “a well regulated Militia, being
necessary to the security of a free
State, the right of the people to keep
and bear Arms shall not be infringed,”4
is a linguistic mess. Not even the place-

ment of the commas is certain.5 What
is certain, though, is that for 200 years
the vast majority of judges interpreted
it to protect only those arms, people,
and activities having some connection
to an organized militia.
During that time, the Supreme Court
directly addressed the meaning of the
Second Amendment only once, and
that came in an odd decision involving the prosecution of a gangster,
Jack Miller, for transporting a shortbarreled shotgun in violation of the
National Firearms Act of 1934 (NFA).
The NFA was Congress’s response to
the gun-fueled gangland violence of
the 1920s and ’30s that had besieged
the nation — including Stevens’s own
home of Chicago. It strictly regulated
short-barreled shotguns and other
weapons, like the Thompson submachine gun, that had become popular
among mobsters and bootleggers. In
United States v. Miller,6 the Court held
that because a short-barreled shotgun
was not suitable for use in a militia,
its possession was not protected by
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the Second Amendment, and Miller’s
indictment was lawful.
The NFA, which is still in force, was
the first federal attempt to significantly regulate firearms, and it has
enjoyed some success (for example,
fully automatic weapons are rarely
used by criminals today). The NFA,
though, was unique only in that it was
a nationwide law. State and local governments had been regulating arms
since the Founding era, with laws that
ran the gamut from permit requirements to prohibitions on particular
classes of weapons to bans on possession by particular classes of people.
Indeed, a search of the Repository
of Historical Gun Laws, a free online
resource hosted by the Center for
Firearms Law at Duke,7 shows that
more than 1,000 state and federal laws
had been enacted by the time Justice
Stevens was born in 1920.
Despite all this regulation, the Second
Amendment did not play a significant
role in firearm policy, because it was
not generally understood to encompass
private uses of weapons. It certainly did
not feature prominently in litigation,
because few regulations interfered
directly with state militias. Indeed,
for more than two centuries, no federal case struck down a law on Second
Amendment grounds.
Although the Amendment remained
legally inert until 2008, it was politically galvanizing. Beginning around
the 1960s, gun rights advocates tried
to use the 27 words of the Amendment
to anchor a right to keep and bear
arms for private purposes like selfdefense. They found allies in advocacy organizations like the National
Rifle Association and in certain (and
sometimes unexpected) quarters of
the academy. But they never had the
right vehicle to advance the issue to
the high court.
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Justice Stevens
dissented, and did
so on Justice Scalia’s
turf. He looked at
the same historical
record, the same
linguistic facts, and
came to the opposite
conclusion.
“Original Public Meaning
Originalism”: Heller, McDonald,
and Stevens in Dissent
Eventually Dick Heller, a special officer at the Federal Judicial Center, of all
places, emerged as an unlikely champion. Heller wanted to keep a firearm
in his home for self-defense, but the
District of Columbia’s regulations
made that impossible in practice. After
he lost in the trial court and succeeded
in the court of appeals, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari. The briefing
was voluminous. Even Vice President
Dick Cheney joined an amicus brief
supporting Heller.
At the same time gun rights advocates promoted their vision of the
Second Amendment to think tanks,
thought leaders, and the public, “original public meaning originalism”
emerged as a prominent interpretive
theory among academics and the judiciary. This kind of originalism rejected
both “the living constitution” (the idea
that the Constitution should be read
as an evolving document) and “original intent” (the notion that it should
be read in accord with the intentions
of the drafters at the Philadelphia
Convention). Instead, original public meaning originalism claimed to be
rooted in historical fact: The words
mean today what a speaker of English
in the ratifying generation would have
understood then.

Justice Antonin Scalia, the most visible advocate for this interpretive
method, wrote for the five-justice
majority in Heller. In keeping with
his methodological commitments, he
crafted a thoroughly originalist opinion, relying heavily on scholarship and
historical sources. According to Scalia,
the central question in Heller was simple and simply stated: How were the
words of the Second Amendment typically understood in 1791?
Scalia held that the two portions
of the Second Amendment were distinct. The “operative” portion was the
part about the right to keep and bear
arms; the “prefatory” part was about
the militia. Resort to the “prefatory”
part was only necessary if the “operative” section was ambiguous. But
the operative portion was absolutely
clear to the majority: The right was to
keep and bear firearms for personal
purposes unrelated to the organized
militia. In support, Justice Scalia cited
evidence from the English Declaration
of Right, Blackstone’s Commentaries,
and several 19th-century cases and
materials that post-dated the ratifying
generation. He dismissed Miller as “an
uncontested and virtually unreasoned
case.”8
Justice Stevens dissented, and did so
on Justice Scalia’s turf.9 He looked at
the same historical record, the same
linguistic facts, and came to the opposite conclusion: A native speaker of
English, reading the words of the
Second Amendment in 1791, would
have understood them to convey a military meaning. Although Justice Scalia
pointed to a few contrary examples,
Justice Stevens quoted his own words
back to him: “The Court does not appear
to grasp the distinction between how a
word can be used and how it ordinarily
is used.”10 Most linguists and historians
agreed with Stevens’s interpretation,
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emphasizing that the phrase “bear
arms” in 1791 was used most often in a
collective, military sense.
What’s especially notable about
Stevens’s dissent in Heller is its good
faith. He was not an originalist, but he
addressed originalists on their terms,
using their tools. He could have written
past the majority opinion and applied
an evolving constitutional standard to
resolve the case. But he was convinced
of the soundness of his argument and
the receptiveness of his fellow justices.
Stevens was apparently so convinced of
the merits of his opinion that he thought
he could persuade the arch-originalist
Justice Clarence Thomas to join it.11
He didn’t, and Heller is now the law.
Two years later, in McDonald v. City of
Chicago12 — a case involving gun regulations in Stevens’s beloved hometown
— the Court had to decide whether
Heller’s right should be incorporated
against state and local governments.
Again, Justice Stevens found himself
dissenting — this time not only about
the constitutionality of gun regulation,
but about how incorporation doctrine
should be understood. And again, Justice
Scalia took the other side, writing a concurring opinion specifically to take issue
with Justice Stevens’s approach.
In both Heller and McDonald, Justice
Stevens authored powerful dissents
rooted in history. Those opinions are
often excerpted in constitutional law
casebooks, and rightly so. But it would
be a mistake to read Stevens’s opinions
as nothing more than a historical manoa-mano with Justice Scalia. In terms of
Second Amendment law and theory,
they are much more than that. With
characteristic clarity, the first three
sentences of his opinion in Heller dissolved a decades-old false dichotomy:
The question presented by this
case is not whether the Second
Amendment protects a “collec-
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tive right” or an “individual right.”
Surely it protects a right that
can be enforced by individuals.
But a conclusion that the Second
Amendment protects an individual right does not tell us anything
about the scope of that right.13
This is profoundly correct, and deftly
sidesteps an unhelpful debate in which
Second Amendment scholarship had
been mired for decades.
Similarly, in McDonald, the Justice
demolished the misunderstanding that
the gun debate is simply about constitutional rights on one side of the
equation and regulatory priorities on
the other. Too often, that frame leads
to the conclusion that only gun owners
have constitutionally relevant interests. But as Justice Stevens noted, “Your
interest in keeping and bearing a certain firearm may diminish my interest
in being and feeling safe from armed
violence.”14 Increasingly, the hard
questions of firearms law are about
conflicting rights.

A “Self-Inflicted Wound”:
Stevens Reflects on Heller
John Paul Stevens lived a very long life,
and among the familiar stories he told
was that, as a 12-year-old growing up
in Chicago, he’d watched Babe Ruth
“call his shot” against the Cubs in 1932.
Stevens had a similar skill at knowing
where constitutional law would fall
during his long tenure on the bench.
His dissent over the constitutionality
of anti-sodomy laws in Bowers v. Hardwick (1986) was vindicated 17 years later
by Lawrence v. Texas (2003).
As it happens, the final dissent he
ever issued, on the last decision day of
his tenure, was McDonald. It is possible that someday that decision will go
down as Justice Stevens’s called shot
on the right to keep and bear arms,
and the Supreme Court will revisit its

decision in Heller. He was not alone in
wishing as much. Many scholars, commentators, advocates, and even some
of his fellow justices have called for its
reconsideration.15
We have our doubts about whether
this will happen. As we wrote in
our recent book, The Positive Second
Amendment: Rights, Regulation, and
the Future of Heller (2018), the basic
holding of Heller — that the Second
Amendment protects a right to keep
and bear arms for certain private purposes, including self-defense — seems
legally and politically secure.
But we agree with Justice Stevens
that the Second Amendment, properly
understood, is not a legal impediment
to the kinds of reasonable gun regulations that form the mainstream of the
U.S. gun debate — things like expanded
background checks, prohibitions on
unreasonably powerful weapons, and
limits on possession by especially dangerous persons. In keeping with Heller’s
admonition (echoed in McDonald) that
gun rights are not absolute, the number and percentage of successful legal
challenges claiming a violation of the
Second Amendment remains quite low.
That low rate of success makes even
more sense when one considers that
stringent gun regulations are rare,
leaving only the most reasonable and
popular regulations open to challenge.
This is not a target-rich environment
for gun rights litigators.
Of course, all of that could change.
Even as we write this, the Supreme
Court is due to hear oral argument
in New York State Rifle and Pistol
Association v. City of New York, a
potentially major Second Amendment
case. Some voices both on and off
the Court have called for an entirely
new structure for evaluating Second
Amendment claims — one that would
apply strict scrutiny across the board,
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or would evaluate gun laws based
solely on a rigid test of text, history,
and tradition. (We have filed an amicus
brief in support of neither side, arguing that the Court should not impose
such a radical change in the law.)
But at least for now, even after
Heller, the primary obstacles to further
gun regulation in the United States are
political, not constitutional. The relevant debates are in legislatures, not
courts. And, to the extent the Second
Amendment keeps being invoked for
propositions that it doesn’t support,
clarifying the law can help improve the
conversation.
Perhaps the Justice recognized
this. After all, he published his postretirement commentary on the Second
Amendment in the popular press and
addressed it to the public, not to legal
elites. In fact, Heller became something
of a preoccupation for Stevens. It was
the opinion that kept him up at night,16
the one that he kept wanting to talk to
people about.
First came his book Six Amendments:
How and Why We Should Change
the Constitution (2014), in which
he proposed to amend the Second
Amendment to read: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of
the people to keep and bear Arms
when serving in the Militia shall not
be infringed.”17 Then, in the wake of
the Parkland shooting, where 17 people were killed by a recently expelled
student on Valentine’s Day 2018,
Stevens openly called for repeal of
the Second Amendment in a New
York Times op-ed. Heller, he said,
“has provided the N.R.A. with a propaganda weapon of immense power.
Overturning that decision via a constitutional amendment to get rid of
the Second Amendment would be
simple and would do more to weaken
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Most recently,
linguistic research
using vast databases
of 18th-century
materials and “big
data” techniques
unavailable in 2008
have tended to
vindicate Justice
Stevens. . . . The
phrase “bear arms”
was overwhelmingly
used in a collective,
military sense in 1791,
just as Justice Stevens
had written.
the N.R.A.’s ability to stymie legislative debate and block constructive
gun control legislation than any other
available option.”18
Near the end of his life, as the pace of
mass shootings increased — in schools,
churches, concert arenas, and clubs —
and as it became apparent the political
branches were incapable of addressing
the violence, Stevens’s agitation grew, as
did his certainty that Heller was wrong.
“These mass shootings are peculiar to
America and are peculiar to a country
that has the Second Amendment,” he
lamented in one of his last interviews.19
“So I think that interpreting the Second
Amendment to protect the individual right to own firearms is really just
absurd, and it’s also terribly important. It happens over and over and over
again. I think I should have been more
forceful in making that point in my
Heller dissent.”20 His autobiography,
published just weeks before his death,
called Heller “the worst self-inflicted
wound in the Court’s history.”21
Others agree. In addition to expressing concern about the social costs,

legal scholars, linguists, and historians have cast serious doubt on Heller’s
basic premises. Most recently, linguistic research using vast databases of
18th-century materials and “big data”
techniques unavailable in 2008 have
tended to vindicate Justice Stevens.
Linguists like Dennis Baron22 and Neal
Goldfarb23 and historians like Alison
LaCroix24 have looked at the material
and have come to a similar conclusion:
The phrase “bear arms” was overwhelmingly used in a collective,
military sense in 1791, just as Justice
Stevens had written.
Whatever its historical or linguistic defects, Heller remains the law of
the land. We wrote the Positive Second
Amendment with that assumption at
the book’s core. And, at least for the
foreseeable future, Heller is not going
anywhere. But, as we argue in the
book, that’s not necessarily bad news
for the large majority of Americans
who believe that gun rights and gun
regulation can co-exist25 — history and
constitutional law are on their side. Our
hope was and is that a proper understanding of the Second Amendment
can tone down the rhetoric and professionalize the gun debate. We remain
optimistic.
Buoyed by that optimism and
encouraged by friends and colleagues,
we sent a copy of the book to Justice
Stevens, hoping for a thank-you note
at best. What we got back instead was
some of the verve that must have been
all too familiar to those who clerked
for the late justice:
Thank you for the copy of your
thoughtful book which I have read
with interest and admiration. I
remain somewhat puzzled by why
you characterize your views as
“positive” and confess that I regard
your explanation of reasons why
the NRA need not fear overrul-
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ing Heller as equally explaining
why the Second Amendment is not
needed to protect gun manufacturers from arbitrary regulation.
In my opinion the main purpose
of the amendment is to enhance
the appeal of NRA arguments
against additional regulations. No
other civilized country has such
an amendment or a comparable
number of gun-related tragedies.
I am convinced that the country
would be better off if the Second
Amendment were repealed.26
The Justice’s letter, written with
characteristic force and tact, makes it
clear that we failed to convince him
of our “positive” vision for the Second
Amendment. But, perhaps more
importantly, we take it as evidence of
his undiminished optimism that peo-

ple are reasonable and persuadable,
and that the soundest arguments will
carry the day in the end. On that, we’re
in complete agreement.
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